falls within the permissible grounds for the termination of a pregnancy? The lack of clarity in the legal rules surrounding selective reduction arises in part from the fact that those rules were formulated when the possibility of destroying selected fetuses, allowing siblings to survive to term, was undreamed of. Thus laws in the English-speaking world are directed at prohibiting inducing miscarriage or terminating pregnancy. Indeed the common law has often avoided conferring direct rights on fetuses, preferring such rights to be contingent on live birth and declaring that until birth the fetus has no legal personality (1). The key issue in England is whether a procedure directed only at selected fetuses is an act done '... with intent to procure a miscarriage' contrary to section 58 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. If as is the case, there is no expulsion of the fetus can there be said to be a 'miscarriage'? Over-technical interpretation of the words of a statute should be avoided, particularly a statute enacted in 1861 when knowledge of the process of fertilisation and implantation was rudimentary. The evil at which the 1861 Act was directed was the killing of the fetus. As John Keown (2) and David Price (3) have argued, any act designed to prevent the continuing development of the fetus and its live birth falls foul of the 1861 Act. And in Australia (4) such an interpretation of section 62 of the Crimes Act 1928, similarly worded to section 58, has found judicial support.
Another argument seeking to place selective reduction beyond the boundaries of the criminal law regulating induced abortion is that the destruction of selected fetuses does not terminate the pregnancy. Where, as in England, the primary legislation prohibits inducing miscarriage, the question of whether the pregnancy as such is terminated is irrelevant. Indeed in England the use of the term 'inducing miscarriage' in the 1861 Act, which prohibits abortion, but the term 'terminating pregnancy' in the 1967 Abortion Act, which sets out grounds for lawful termination of pregnancy, creates a Catch 22 for selective reduction. If the 1861 Act prohibits destuction of the fetus, and the 1967 Act sets out grounds for the lawful termination ofpregnancy, it has been cogently argued that incomplete termination is beyond the scope of the 1967 Act thus selective reduction can never be other than a criminal act (3).
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However, to suggest that the 1861 Act must be construed in the light of its general purpose, and the 1967 Act be interpreted literally, is somewhat unreasonable. And I would consider that while selective reduction is caught by the criminal law the procedure falls within the 1967 Act if the grounds therein can be satisfied.
Where selective reduction is designed to destroy a handicapped fetus then in England at least the legality of that operation seems relatively unproblematic. A substantial risk that the child will be seriously handicapped is a lawful ground for abortion under section 1(1) (b) ofthe 1967 Act. Ifa multiple pregnancy threatens the physical or mental health of the mother, selective reduction must be justifiable under section 1(1) (a) of that same Act. The grey area lies where, as will usually be the case, the procedure is carried out to enable the other fetuses to survive. The Abortion Act of course permits termination where the continuance of the pregnancy jeopardises the health of 'existing children' of the family. On current legal principles the fetus does not qualify as an existing child endowed with legal personality and rights ofits own. And attempting to argue that fetuses A and B are existing children whose health, even life, must be preserved by destroying C and D causes some philosophical and semantic difficulty. If A and B are children so are C and D and the common law has always asserted that it is unlawful to kill one person to save the life of another (5), save in self-defence.
The overwhelming probability is that selective reduction of pregnancy in England constitutes criminal abortion and can be lawful only on grounds specified in the Abortion Act and in accordance with the procedures required by that Act. The reality is that the criminal law regulating abortion was never designed to cope with the ethical problems inherent in selective reduction. Jansen may in the event be right that the criminal process will not be invoked. This is not because selective reduction is lawful but because prosecutors will shy away from the minefield of legal problems posed by the procedures, and legislators are unwilling to confront the moral problems thrown up thereby. (10) . In Canada (11) and certain States of the USA he must meet the higher 'prudent patient' standard (12) .
Administration of mifdpristone without adequate counselling of the risk inherent in the drug and consequent need for surgical abortion is likely to engage legal liability. In England any undqrtaking by the patient to agree to surgical abortion is as such unenforceable. But such an undertaking is unnecessary if proper consent has initially been obtained from the mother. However, should negligence at the initial stage be proved, could the mother's subsequent refusal of surgical abortion be regarded as contributory negligence thus reducing the award of damages against the doctor? In England it may well be that such a refusal would not constitute contributory negligence. If the possible need for later surgical abortion was not made clear from the outset, a court might be unwilling in effect to penalise a patient who has been misled. And in any case, as the alleged negligence by the mother did not contribute to the relevant disability but only allowed the birth of the infant, any contributory negligence on her part will not go to reduce the child's claim (13) .
Conclusions
Gynaecologists are right to be concerned about the legal implications of selective reduction and the 'abortion pill'. Nevertheless the lack of clarity in the law may save them from much actual litigation. Attempting to 'bend' rules never designed to deal with either procedure benefits no one, but what legislature will have the courage to confront the ethical and legal problems of modern abortion techniques directly? Margaret Brazier is Reader in Law at the University of Manchester.
